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II.-274 
PUBLIC OR PRIVATE? THE SPLIT OVER 
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF 
UNION SPEECH BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
Abstract: On May 16, 2018, the Second Circuit held, in Montero v. City of Yon-
kers, that a police officer who criticized other officers at a union meeting and 
then sued for retaliation in the wake of his remarks spoke “as a private citizen” 
and was therefore protected by the First Amendment. However, the Second Cir-
cuit limited its ruling by refusing to adopt a per se rule that any person who 
speaks as a union member speaks “as a private citizen” and is therefore protect-
ed from retaliation by the First Amendment. By specifically refusing to adopt a 
per se rule on union speech, the Second Circuit split from the Sixth, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits, which have established categorical rules stating that union 
speech is distinct from employee speech. This Comment argues that the categor-
ical rules regarding union speech adopted by the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Cir-
cuits are in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, and that the Second 
Circuit was therefore incorrect in its decision not to adopt such a categorical 
rule. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, a police officer named Raymond Montero brought a 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 suit alleging that his superior officers retaliated against him for his 
criticism of his supervisors at two police union meetings.1 Montero’s suit was 
not the first of its kind: in recent years, several circuits have ruled on cases 
brought by police officers alleging retaliation in violation of the First 
Amendment for comments made in their capacities as union members.2 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Montero v. City of Yonkers (Montero I), 224 F. Supp. 3d 257, 259–60, 273, 275 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that a police officer did not have a First Amendment claim because he 
did not speak “as a private citizen” when participating in a union discussion and dismissing the 
case with prejudice), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 890 F.3d. 386 (2d Cir. 2018); Complaint at 1, 
Montero I, 224 F. Supp. 3d 257 (No. 15-CV-4327 (KMK)) (arguing that the defendants had either 
retaliated against Montero or been complicit in retaliation against him as a result of his speech). 
Section 1983 of Chapter 42 of the U.S. Code makes certain government entities liable for viola-
tions of constitutional rights “cause[d]” by government employees acting under color of state law, 
when such conduct represents a governmental custom. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 
658, 692 (1978). 
 2 See Montero v. City of Yonkers (Montero II), 890 F.3d. 386, 390, 399 (2d Cir. 2018) (hold-
ing that a police officer who claimed retaliation “spoke as a private citizen” when he made com-
ments at union meeting, but refusing to establish a per se rule that any union member speaking in 
that capacity does so “as a private citizen”); Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 528–29, 535 (6th 
Cir. 2015) (holding that a police union member’s remarks at a contract negotiation meeting met 
the requirements for First Amendment protection, but affirming summary judgment for the de-
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However, in deciding Montero’s case, the Second Circuit split from the Sixth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits by choosing not to adopt a per se rule that a pub-
lic employee speaks “as a private citizen” when he or she speaks on union 
matters.3 
Part I of this Comment explains the factual and procedural background 
of Montero’s case, as well as the Supreme Court precedent on the issue of 
First Amendment protections for the speech of public employees.4 Part II de-
scribes the current circuit split between the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Cir-
cuits, which have adopted categorical rules protecting union speech as the 
speech of private citizens, and the Second Circuit, which has declined to 
adopt such a rule.5 Finally, Part III argues that the Second Circuit was incor-
rect in failing to adopt a categorical rule, and that, in doing so, it has diverged 
from the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Janus v. American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal Employees.6 
I. EVALUATING FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR PUBLIC  
EMPLOYEES IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
Raymond Montero’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit for alleged retaliation in vio-
lation of his First Amendment rights is not the first of its kind, as the Supreme 
Court and circuit courts have grappled for decades with the question of how 
                                                                                                                           
fendants because the plaintiff failed to show that the actions taken against him were directly tied to 
his speech rather than various allegations of inappropriate behavior); Swetlik v. Crawford, 738 
F.3d 818, 826, 829 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding a police officer’s statements at a union meeting and in 
a union grievance were protected, but ruling that the allegedly retaliatory action against the officer 
was justified on other grounds and therefore upholding summary judgment for the defendants); 
Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding a police union 
president’s speech criticizing the police chief could be protected, and thus reversing summary 
judgment for the police chief); Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 772, 775 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that summary judgment for a defendant was improper where the plaintiff, a deputy sheriff and 
union president who criticized his superior, brought a retaliation claim after not receiving a pro-
motion). 
 3 Compare Montero II, 890 F.3d at 390, 399 (holding a police officer who claimed retaliation 
“spoke as a private citizen” when he made comments at union meeting, but refusing to establish a 
per se rule that any union member who speaks in that capacity does so “as a private citizen”), with 
Boulton, 795 F.3d at 534 (holding that a union member who speaks on union matters speaks “as a 
citizen” for purposes of First Amendment protection), and Swetlik, 738 F.3d at 826 (holding that 
because a police officer’s statements at a union meeting and in a union grievance were made in the 
context of his union membership, they were not made pursuant to his employment duties and were 
therefore protected), and Ellins, 710 F.3d at 1060 (stating that natural conflicts exist between 
employers and unions of employees, and therefore ruling that when police officers speak pursuant 
to their union membership, they do not speak as public employees), and Fuerst, 454 F.3d at 774 
(stating that a police officer’s statements make in the context of his union membership were not 
part of his job duties as a police officer). 
 4 See infra notes 7–49 and accompanying text. 
 5 See infra notes 50–75 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 76–88 and accompanying text. 
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much protection must be afforded to public employee speech under the First 
Amendment.7 Section A of this Part outlines the facts that served as the basis 
for Montero’s claim of retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights.8 
Section B provides the procedural history of Montero’s case.9 Section C pro-
vides an overview of the legal background of First Amendment retaliation 
cases involving public employees.10 
A. Factual Background of Montero II 
The facts underlying Montero’s § 1983 suit date back to 2009, when 
Montero worked in the Yonkers Police Department (“YPD”) Special Investi-
gations Gang Unit and decided to run for vice president of the Yonkers Police 
Benevolent Association (“Yonkers PBA”).11 The Yonkers PBA elected Mon-
                                                                                                                           
 7 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 414–15, 424 (2006) (holding that retaliation against 
an assistant district attorney who wrote a memo critical of a search warrant affidavit and then 
testified for the defense at a pre-trial hearing did not violate the employee’s constitutional right 
because the speech was not protected by the First Amendment); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
141, 154 (1983) (holding that the termination of an assistant district attorney’s employment after 
she circulated an office questionnaire critical of office policies did not violate her constitutional 
right to free speech); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 564–65 
(1968) (holding that retaliation against a public school teacher who wrote a letter to the editor of a 
newspaper criticizing the school board was an unconstitutional violation of the teacher’s First 
Amendment rights); Montero II, 890 F.3d. at 390, 399 (holding a police officer who claimed retal-
iation “spoke as a private citizen” when he made comments at a union meeting, but refusing to 
establish a per se rule that any union member who speaks in that capacity “speaks as a private 
citizen”); Boulton, 795 F.3d at 528–29, 535 (holding a police union member’s remarks at a con-
tract negotiation meeting met the requirements for First Amendment protection, but affirming 
summary judgment for the defendants because the plaintiff failed to show that the actions taken 
against him were directly tied to his speech rather than various allegations of inappropriate behav-
ior made against him); Swetlik, 738 F.3d at 826, 829 (holding police officer’s statements at a un-
ion meeting and in a union grievance were protected but ruling that the termination charges 
against the officer were justified on other grounds and therefore upholding summary judgment for 
the defendants); Ellins, 710 F.3d at 1060, 1067 (holding a police union president’s speech criticiz-
ing the police chief could be protected, and thus reversing summary judgment for the police 
chief); Fuerst, 454 F.3d at 772, 775 (holding that summary judgment for a defendant was improp-
er where a deputy sheriff and union president who criticized his superior brought a retaliation 
claim after not receiving a promotion). See generally Marni M. Zack, Note, Public Employee Free 
Speech: The Policy Reasons for Rejecting a Per Se Rule Precluding Speech Rights, 46 B.C. L. 
REV. 893, 894 (2005) (outlining Supreme Court precedent on public employee free speech and 
explaining that public employee speech may be more restricted under the First Amendment than 
ordinary citizen speech). 
 8 See infra notes 11–25 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 30–49 and accompanying text. 
 11 Montero I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 259–60; Complaint, supra note 1, at 4. Yonkers Police Be-
nevolent Association (“Yonkers PBA”) is the Yonkers Police Department (“YPD”) employee 
union. Montero II, 890 F.3d. at 391. Montero’s complaint stated that at the time of his suit, Monte-
ro had been a police officer in Yonkers for more than twenty-six years. Complaint, supra note 1, 
at 1. Edmund Hartnett was the commissioner of the YPD from 2006 to 2011. Id. at 3. At the time 
of Montero’s suit, Keith Olson was a police officer with the YPD and the president of Yonkers 
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tero as vice president of the union and another police officer, Keith Olson, as 
president in January 2010.12 
During a Yonkers PBA meeting in 2010, Montero criticized YPD Com-
missioner Edmund Hartnett for his decision to discontinue several police 
units, arguing that the cuts would cause problems for the YPD and the City of 
Yonkers.13 According to Montero, in July 2010, Lieutenant John Mueller 
called Montero into his office and threatened to transfer Montero to another 
unit if he did not stop speaking out against Commissioner Hartnett.14 Montero 
nonetheless called for a vote of no confidence in Hartnett at a Yonkers PBA 
meeting in February 2011.15 
According to Montero, after his speech at the 2011 Yonkers PBA meet-
ings, Olson, Lieutenant Mueller, and Detective Sergeant Moran retaliated 
against him.16 In March 2011, Olson, Mueller, and Moran conducted an un-
approved investigation into Montero’s overtime reporting.17 The following 
month, Montero was transferred out of the Special Investigations Unit to the 
Detective Division.18 In September 2011, Mueller allegedly conducted a sec-
ond unapproved investigation of Montero related to Montero’s supposed in-
subordination, and Olson verbally accosted Montero.19 
                                                                                                                           
PBA. Id. Brian Moran was a Detective Sergeant with the YPD. Id. John Mueller was a police 
officer with the YPD and, beginning in May 2015, served as Chief of Support Services. Id. 
 12 Montero II, 890 F.3d at 391. Montero alleged that throughout the election season, Olson 
expressed opposition to Montero and instead advocated for Officer Michael Farina to be elected 
vice president. Id. 
 13 Id. The units to be cut included a unit “dedicated to investigating domestic violence and bur-
glary” and a “community unit dedicated to supporting the Police Athletic League.” Id. At the June 
2010 meeting, Montero also announced his plan to call for a no-confidence vote in Hartnett the 
next time the Yonkers PBA met. Montero I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 260. 
 14 Montero I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 260; Amended Complaint at 4, Montero I, 224 F. Supp. 3d 
257 (No. 15-CV-4327 (KMK)). 
 15 Montero II, 890 F.3d at 391. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. Montero asserted that this kind of investigation had to be performed by the Internal 
Affairs Division and that the allegations that Montero had falsely reported his overtime work were 
untrue. Montero I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 260. This investigation resulted in Montero receiving a writ-
ten disciplinary notice and being denied forty hours of pay. Montero II, 890 F.3d at 391. 
 18 Montero II, 890 F.3d at 391–92. In his Amended Complaint, Montero stated this was a 
“functional demotion” because the Special Investigations Unit from which he was transferred was 
more favorable than the Detective Division. Amended Complaint, supra note 14, at 5. In this new 
position, Montero could no longer be paid for overtime work and had to perform “desk duty.” 
Montero II, 890 F.3d at 392. Montero asserted that shortly after this, Olson acknowledged that the 
transfer was the result of Montero’s criticism of Olson’s and Hartnett’s decisions at the prior union 
meetings. Id. 
 19 Montero II, 890 F.3d at 392. Montero alleged that in September 2011, Olson verbally ac-
costed him after learning that Montero planned to run in opposition to him for president of the 
union, swore at him, and stated that Olson should “kick his ass.” Montero I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 
261. Montero’s office was also vandalized with pictures of the Cowardly Lion from “The Wizard 
of Oz” that month, and Montero alleged that Olson planned this vandalism. Id. The YPD Internal 
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Montero further alleged that in January 2012, Olson, Mueller, and Mo-
ran engaged in a third unapproved investigation of him, challenging whether 
Montero was sick when he took sick leave.20 In October 2013, Olson alleged-
ly contacted Montero to say that he wanted to meet Montero “in another ju-
risdiction and preferably off duty,” which Montero perceived as a threat.21 In 
November of that year, several YPD police officers informed the City of 
Yonkers’ attorney that Montero was being harassed as a result of his conflict 
with Olson.22 Finally, at a Yonkers PBA meeting in January 2014, Olson pub-
licly demanded that Montero be removed from the union.23 Olson later circu-
lated a petition containing allegedly false allegations against Montero.24 Mon-
tero was formally removed from the Yonkers PBA in June 2014.25 
B. Procedural History of Montero II 
After Montero brought his § 1983 suit in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York, the defendants filed a motion to dis-
miss the amended complaint on several grounds.26 The district court granted 
the defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice in Montero v. City of Yon-
kers (“Montero I”).27 The court held that because Montero’s comments at the 
                                                                                                                           
Affairs Department took no action when Montero reported the threats and vandalism. Montero II, 
890 F.3d at 392. 
 20 Montero II, 890 F.3d at 392. Moran instructed another police officer to seize security foot-
age that documented where Montero had been, and also photographed Montero’s vehicle. Montero 
I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 261. Montero alleged that he was allowed to leave his home while on sick 
leave and that the YPD’s Medical Control Unit should have performed the investigation. Id. None-
theless, the YPD deducted two-days’ salary from Montero. Id. 
 21 Montero II, 890 F.3d at 392. Montero reported this message to the Internal Affairs Divi-
sion, but the Division took no action. Montero I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 262. 
 22 Montero I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 262. 
 23 Montero II, 890 F.3d at 392. Olson’s associates allegedly blocked Montero from leaving 
the union meeting. Id. After the meeting, Olson directed other police officers to confiscate video 
tapes of the meeting. Montero I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 262. The Internal Affairs Division ultimately 
investigated this action by Olson and stated that Olson should be subject to discipline for confis-
cating the tapes. Id. No further action was taken, however. Id. 
 24 Montero II, 890 F.3d at 392–93. According to Montero, the petition contained false allega-
tions that Montero punched a union trustee at the January 2014 union meeting, among other alle-
gations. Montero I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 262. 
 25 Montero I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 262. 
 26 Montero II, 890 F.3d at 393; Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss the 
Amended Complaint at 1, Montero I, 224 F. Supp. 3d 257 (No. 15-CV-4327 (KMK)). The City of 
Yonkers, Brian Moran, and John Mueller moved to dismiss, claiming that Montero had neither an 
adequate First Amendment claim nor a municipal liability claim, and that Moran and Mueller should 
be granted qualified immunity. Montero I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 260. Olson also argued that Montero 
had not established an adequate claim for retaliation that contravened the First Amendment. Id. 
 27 See Montero I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 275. In its ruling, the court noted that Montero had al-
ready amended his complaint once, and that at oral argument Montero’s counsel could not pro-
duce any additional examples of protected speech by Montero that were not included in the 
Amended Complaint. Id. at 274–75. 
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June 2010 and February 2011 meetings were not made while Montero acted 
as a “private citizen,” they were not protected by the First Amendment.28 In 
January 2017, Montero filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s order 
granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss.29 
C. The Second Circuit’s Reversal and Supreme Court Precedent 
On appeal, the Second Circuit, in Montero v. City of Yonkers (“Montero 
II”), addressed the question of whether a police officer criticizing other offic-
ers at a union meeting speaks as a “private citizen” for purposes of the First 
Amendment right to free speech.30 The Second Circuit ruled that Montero 
spoke as an individual citizen when he spoke on union matters, but declined 
to establish a per se rule that all union speech is not made as part of a public 
employee’s job duties but instead is the speech of “private citizen[s].”31 
Montero II is the most recent in a series of cases evaluating what type of 
speech made by public officials is protected by the First Amendment.32 In 
Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, the 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether First Amendment protections 
extend to public employees in the context of a teacher who was fired from his 
job after writing a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the school board and 
superintendent’s handling of school revenue proposals.33 Writing for the ma-
                                                                                                                           
 28 Montero II, 890 F.3d at 393. The district court stated that Montero’s claim should be evalu-
ated using the two-step analysis for First Amendment retaliation cases brought by public employ-
ees: first, evaluating whether Montero spoke in his capacity as a private citizen on a “matter of 
public concern,” and second, evaluating whether the government employer in question had a legit-
imate reason for treating its employee differently from a non-employee member of the public. 
Montero I, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 264–65. The district court did not reach the second step of the anal-
ysis, however, because it concluded that Montero did not speak in his capacity as a “private citi-
zen.” Id. at 265, 273. The court reasoned that because Montero chose to speak at a union meeting 
that was not open to the public, he did not speak in the same way a non-union, non-employee 
member of the public would. See id. at 271. In deciding that Montero’s speech was not protected 
by the First Amendment, the court also noted that Montero’s speech was “at least tangentially 
related” to his official duties. Id. 
 29 Notice of Appeal at 1, Montero I, 224 F. Supp. 3d 257 (No. 15-CV-4327 (KMK)). 
 30 See Montero II, 890 F.3d at 390. 
 31 Id. at 399. 
 32 See, e.g., Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414–15, 424 (holding that retaliation against an assistant 
district attorney who wrote a memo critical of a search warrant affidavit and then testified for the 
defense at a pre-trial hearing did not violate the employee’s constitutional right because the em-
ployee’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment); Connick, 461 U.S. at 141, 154 (hold-
ing that the termination of an assistant district attorney’s employment after she circulated an office 
questionnaire critical of office policies did not violate her constitutional right to free speech); 
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564–65 (holding that retaliation against a public school teacher who wrote a 
letter to the editor of a newspaper criticizing the school board was an unconstitutional violation of 
the teacher’s First Amendment rights). 
 33 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564, 565 (holding that the plaintiff teacher’s free speech rights 
were violated when he was fired after writing a public letter criticizing the Board of Educations’ 
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jority, Justice Marshall declined to outline specific rules for evaluating the 
statements of public employees.34 The Court, however, made it clear that pub-
lic employees do not give up their First Amendment right to comment on 
matters of public concern simply because they are employed by the govern-
ment.35 Rather, if public employees speak in their capacity as citizens on 
“matters of public concern,” then those statements are protected by the First 
Amendment.36 The Court concluded the central issue in such cases was to 
weigh the interests of the public employee as a private citizen speaking on a 
public matter with the interests of the government employer trying to effec-
tively complete its duties.37 
More than a decade later, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue 
in Connick v. Myers, this time in the context of an assistant district attorney’s 
termination.38 Writing for the majority, Justice White centered the Court’s 
analysis on the determination of whether the public employee spoke on a 
                                                                                                                           
handling of revenue proposals). The teacher’s letter criticized the school board’s decisions regard-
ing bond proposals and allocation of financial resources for school programs in the district. Id. at 
566. Additionally, the letter claimed the superintendent had attempted to stop teachers from pub-
licly criticizing the proposal. Id. The teacher’s dismissal from his job came after a board hearing 
which determined that the teacher’s letter was “detrimental to the efficient operation and admin-
istration of the schools of the district,” and that under the relevant Illinois statute, a dismissal was 
necessary. Id. at 564–65. 
 34 Id. at 569. The Court reasoned that because the array of scenarios in which a public em-
ployee’s critical statements may be deemed grounds for dismissal by superiors is so vast, it would 
not be appropriate to establish a general rule for evaluating such statements. Id. The Court, how-
ever, did recognize the need to outline general provisions for how an evaluation of a public em-
ployee’s statement should proceed. Id. Following Pickering, the Supreme Court again refused to 
establish a general rule for evaluating the statements of public employees in Connick. See Con-
nick, 461 U.S. at 154 (repeating Pickering’s conclusion that it would be unrealistic to establish a 
general framework for evaluating public employee statements that could justify termination of 
employment). 
 35 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 140 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568) (quoting Pickering and 
reiterating that government workers do not give up their First Amendment rights to speak on 
“matters of public interest” simply because they work for the government). 
 36 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 378 U.S. 64 (1964)) (stating 
that the Court has suggested that public employee speech on “matters of public concern” is pro-
tected by the First Amendment even when such speech implicates the employee’s superiors). 
 37 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. The Court ultimately reversed, concluding that the teacher 
commented on a “matter of legitimate public concern,” and that his First Amendment right had 
been violated. Id. at 565, 571. 
 38 Connick, 461 U.S. at 140. In Connick, Assistant District Attorney Sheila Myers objected to 
being transferred to a different department. Id. After being transferred in spite of her opposition to 
such a move, Myers circulated an office questionnaire requesting input from her colleagues con-
cerning various policies within the office, the degree of faith in office leadership, and whether 
members of the office felt obligated to campaign for certain political candidates. Id. at 141. After 
circulating the questionnaire, Myers’ supervisor notified her that because she would not accept the 
transfer, she would be dismissed. Id. Additionally, the supervisor accused her of defiance for cir-
culating the questionnaire. Id. 
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“matter of public concern.”39 Justice White wrote that the question of whether 
an employee speaks about a “matter of public concern” must be determined 
by the full context in which the statement was made.40 The Supreme Court 
later explained in Garcetti v. Ceballos that the First Amendment analysis in 
cases involving allegedly protected speech of public officials must proceed in 
two parts.41 Initially, a court must determine whether the employee “spoke as 
a citizen on a matter of public concern.”42 If the employee’s speech was not 
“as a citizen on a matter of public concern,” then the employee has no First 
Amendment claim.43 If the employee did speak “on a matter of public con-
cern,” however, the next step in the analysis is to determine whether the gov-
                                                                                                                           
 39 See id. at 147–48 (stating that even if Myers’ speech was not entirely focused on a “matter 
of public concern,” it would not necessarily fall outside the scope of First Amendment protection). 
 40 Id. The Court used the Pickering balancing test to evaluate Myer’s claim and concluded 
that because one of the questions in her questionnaire involved a “matter of public concern”—
namely, whether staff in the office felt obligated to campaign for certain political candidates sup-
ported by the District Attorney’s office—it could be protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 149; 
see Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (describing the need to balance between the public employee’s free 
speech interest and the government employer’s interest in efficient operation of its duties). Despite 
this, in the second part of the Pickering analysis—evaluating whether Myer’s boss was justified in 
firing her—the Court concluded that the government interest in efficiently running the District 
Attorney’s office outweighed the small First Amendment interest at issue. See Connick, 461 U.S. 
at 154 (stating that while Myers had a First Amendment right, this right did not force supervisors 
to allow speech that could inhibit the functioning of the office); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (de-
scribing the need to balance between the public employee’s free speech interest and the govern-
ment employer’s interest in efficient operation of its duties). 
 41 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. In Garcetti, a deputy district attorney, Ceballos, was informed by 
a defense attorney that an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant contained false information. Id. 
at 413–14. After confirming that the affidavit was inaccurate, Ceballos informed his supervisors of 
his findings and then prepared a memorandum on the matter. Id. at 414. Ceballos’s supervisors 
nonetheless chose to move forward with a case using the search warrant, and when the trial court 
held a hearing on the defense’s motion to traverse, Ceballos testified for the defense about his 
conclusions regarding the affidavit. Id. at 414–15. Following his testimony, Ceballos’s supervisors 
allegedly retaliated against him. Id. at 415. The retaliation included Ceballos not receiving a pro-
motion and being transferred both out of his calendar deputy position and to another courthouse. 
Id. 
 42 Id. at 418. The Court recognized that the vast array of potential factual situations related to 
a public employee’s speech can make this analysis challenging. Id. However, the Court analyzed 
several factors to determine whether Ceballos spoke as a citizen about a “matter of public con-
cern.” Id. On the issue of whether he spoke as a citizen, the Court stated that the facts that Ce-
ballos’s speech occurred in his office rather than in public, and that the subject matter of his 
speech related to his employment were not necessarily determinative factors. Id. at 420, 421. The 
Court, however, stated that speech made “pursuant to . . . official duties” of public employees does 
not constitute private citizen speech under the First Amendment and that since Ceballos’s speech 
fell under his job duties as a deputy district attorney, he did not speak as a private citizen. Id at 
421. Because the parties stipulated that Ceballos’s speech was made pursuant to his job duties, the 
Court declined to adopt a set of guidelines for assessing the extent of an employee’s job require-
ments, but specifically noted that employers cannot limit the rights of employees by simply writ-
ing vague job descriptions. Id. at 424. 
 43 Id. at 418. 
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ernment had an appropriate reason for treating its employee differently than it 
would treat a private citizen.44 
Garcetti specifically addressed the question of whether the First 
Amendment prohibits retaliation against public employees for statements 
“made pursuant to the employee’s official duties.”45 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Kennedy explained that while a public employer may limit employee 
speech, it can only constrain employee speech that could impact the functions 
of the government organization.46 He further stated that when public employ-
ees speak as citizens about “matters of public concern,” the government is 
limited to restrictions that are necessary to ensure the government’s functions 
are not impeded.47 The Court concluded that the decisive element in Garcetti 
was the fact that the employee’s speech had been made “pursuant to his du-
ties.”48 The Court ultimately ruled that when public employees speak as part 
of their official duties, that speech is not protected by the First Amendment.49 
II. DIVERGENT VIEWS ON CATEGORICAL RULES REGARDING UNION SPEECH 
Circuit courts have taken different views on categorical rules regarding 
First Amendment protection of union speech in the context of public em-
ployment.50 Section A of this Part summarizes the categorical rules on union 
speech that the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have adopted in recent 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 413. 
 46 Id. at 418. 
 47 Id. at 419. 
 48 Id. at 421. 
 49 Id. The Court concluded the memorandum written by Ceballos fell into the category of 
employee statements “made pursuant to official responsibilities.” Id. at 424. Therefore, because 
the First Amendment does not protect employees from retaliation due to statements made as part 
of their job duties, the Court held that Ceballos did not have an adequate constitutional claim. See 
id. at 421, 424 (stating that Ceballos’s claim failed because the First Amendment allows employ-
ers to discipline employees for speech they make as part of their job duties). 
 50 See Montero v. City of Yonkers (Montero II), 890 F.3d. 386, 390, 399 (2d Cir. 2018) (hold-
ing that a police officer who claimed retaliation “spoke as a private citizen” when he made com-
ments at a union meeting, but refusing to establish a per se rule that any union member who 
speaks in that capacity “speaks as a private citizen”); Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th 
Cir. 2015) (holding that a union member who speaks on union matters speaks “as a citizen” for 
purposes of First Amendment protection); Swetlik v. Crawford, 738 F.3d 818, 826 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that because a police officer’s statements at a union meeting and in a union grievance 
were made in the context of his union membership, they were not made pursuant to his employ-
ment duties and were therefore protected); Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1060 
(9th Cir. 2013) (stating that natural conflicts exist between employers and unions of employees, 
and therefore ruling that when police officers speak pursuant to their union membership, they do 
not speak as public employees); Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that a 
police officer’s statements made in the context of his union membership were not part of his job 
duties as a police officer). 
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years.51 Section B describes the Second Circuit’s split from those courts 
through its decision in Montero v. City of Yonkers (“Montero II”) not to adopt 
a categorical rule on union speech.52 
A. Per Se Rules on Union Speech 
Prior to Montero II, several circuits had addressed the issue of public 
employee speech in the context of a union and ruled that such speech cannot 
be part of the employees’ job duties and must be protected from retaliation by 
the First Amendment.53 The Seventh Circuit addressed the question in Fuerst 
v. Clarke.54 In that case, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a police officer 
did not speak as part of his official job duties when he spoke in his capacity 
as a union member.55 In December 2013, the Seventh Circuit reiterated the 
distinction between speech made as an employee and speech made by a “pri-
vate citizen” in the context of First Amendment protections for union mem-
bers in Swetlik v. Crawford.56 In evaluating a police officer’s claim for retalia-
                                                                                                                           
 51 See infra notes 53–69 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 70–75 and accompanying text. 
 53 Boulton, 795 F.3d at 528–29, 535 (holding that a police union member’s remarks at a con-
tract negotiation meeting met the requirements for First Amendment protection, but affirming 
summary judgment for defendants because plaintiff failed to show that the actions taken against 
him were directly tied to his speech rather than various allegations of inappropriate behavior made 
against him); Swetlik, 738 F.3d at 826, 829 (holding that a police officer’s statements at a union 
meeting and in a union grievance were protected but ruling that the termination charges against 
the officer were justified on other grounds and therefore upholding summary judgment for de-
fendants); Ellins, 710 F.3d at 1060, 1067 (holding a police union president’s speech criticizing the 
police chief could be protected, and thus reversing summary judgment for the police chief); 
Fuerst, 454 F.3d at 772, 775 (holding that summary judgment for a defendant was improper where 
a deputy sheriff and union president who criticized his superior brought a retaliation claim after 
not receiving a promotion). 
 54 See Fuerst, 454 F.3d at 774 (stating that there is a difference between an officer speaking in 
his capacity as a member of a union, and speaking as part of his job duties as an officer). The 
Fuerst case involved a police officer in Milwaukee who served as president of the deputy sheriff’s 
union and publicly criticized Sheriff Clarke about a proposal regarding the hiring of civilians. Id. 
at 771–72. Specifically, Fuerst said that Clarke’s plan to fill a job traditionally performed by a 
deputy sheriff with a civilian was a poor use of tax dollars. Id. at 772. Prior to this criticism, Fuerst 
publicly campaigned against Clarke when the latter ran for sheriff. Id. After Fuerst made these 
statements, Clarke chose not to promote Fuerst, despite the fact that Fuerst had received the sec-
ond-highest score on the relevant examination out of more than one hundred candidates. Id. For 
purposes of the case, Clarke agreed that he chose not to promote Fuerst as a result of Fuerst’s 
public criticism. Id. 
 55 See id. at 774 (stating that there is a difference between an officer speaking in his capacity 
as a member of a union, and speaking as part of his job duties as an officer). The Seventh Circuit 
made a specific distinction between comments the officer made “in his capacity as a union repre-
sentative” and comments made “in the course of his employment as a deputy sheriff.” Id. 
 56 Swetlik, 738 F.3d at 826. Brian Swetlik, a police detective from Manitowoc, Wisconsin, 
brought a claim against several defendants in the City of Manitowoc claiming that his First 
Amendment rights were violated after the defendants petitioned to have him terminated. See id. at 
820–21. Swetlik claimed that the goal of terminating him was part of a retaliatory campaign 
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tion in response to criticisms of the police chief that the officer made as a un-
ion member, the Seventh Circuit made a distinction between statements made 
in an officer’s “capacity as a union member” and statements that are “part of 
his official duties as a police detective.”57 The court ultimately concluded that 
the officer’s comments at a union meeting and in a list of complaints were 
protected by the First Amendment.58 
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the issue of employee speech in the 
context of union speech in 2013.59 In Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, a police 
officer filed a suit alleging retaliation as a result of speech he made in his po-
sition as president of the police union.60 Quoting Connick, the Ninth Circuit 
reaffirmed that determination of whether an employee’s speech regards a 
“matter of public concern” requires a context-specific analysis.61 The court 
ruled that concerns about the police department were “matters of public con-
cern,” and, adopting language from Fuerst, that the police officers speaking 
                                                                                                                           
against him after he criticized the police chief. Id. at 821. Swetlik’s criticisms of the chief centered 
around his claim that, during a phone call between the two of them, the chief instructed Swetlik to 
lie to jail officers regarding the necessity of interrogation of a suspect in custody. Id. at 822. At the 
police chief’s request, the Manitowoc mayor ultimately commenced an investigation into union 
complaints against the chief, resulting in an investigation report that recommended terminating 
Swetlik because he had lied about what was said in his phone call with the chief. Id. at 822, 823. 
 57 Id. at 826. 
 58 Id. The Seventh Circuit stated that Swetlik’s claims about the police chief went to the issue 
of the chief’s ability to effectively perform his job, which was a concern for public safety. Id. at 
827. The Seventh Circuit, however, ultimately affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment because although employers cannot escape First Amendment liability by claiming the 
employee speech in question was untrue, they can escape liability if “supervisors reasonably be-
lieved, after an adequate investigation, that [the employee’s] testimony was false, even if it actual-
ly was true.” Id. at 828–29 (quoting Wright v. Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 
1492, 1506 (7th Cir. 1994)). Because the mayor’s investigation indicated that Swetlik had made 
false statements, the Seventh Circuit held that his termination did not ultimately violate the First 
Amendment. Id. at 829. 
 59 See Ellins, 710 F.3d at 1053 (holding that a police officer who led a vote of no confidence 
in the chief of police and subsequently endured adverse employment actions met his summary 
judgment burden for establishing retaliation in violation of the First Amendment). Ellins involved 
a claim of retaliation by the president of the Sierra Madre Police Association under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. Id. 
 60 Id. at 1053–54. After Ellins organized a vote of no confidence in the police chief by the 
police union, the chief refused to help Ellins obtain a certification that would have made him eli-
gible for a pay increase. Id. Defendants moved for summary judgment after Ellins sued, and the 
district court granted it, ruling that Ellins failed to establish an adequate case of First Amendment 
retaliation. Id. 
 61 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983); Ellins, 710 F.3d at 1057. The Ninth 
Circuit adopted language from Connick stating that the determination of “[w]hether an employee’s 
speech addresses a matter of public concern” depends on “the content, form, and context of a 
given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Ellins, 710 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Connick, 461 
U.S. at 147–48). The court distinguished between individual personnel grievances and collective 
ones, stating that collective union personnel grievances could be considered “matters of public 
concern.” Id. at 1057–58. 
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as members of the police union did not act pursuant to their official duties as 
public employees.62 
In Boulton v. Swanson, the Sixth Circuit also addressed the issue of 
whether speech in the context of a government union is protected under the 
First Amendment.63 Relying on Garcetti, the Sixth Circuit reiterated the two-
part analysis, asking first whether the employee spoke as a “citizen on a mat-
ter of public concern,” and, if so, whether the employee’s interest in free 
speech outweighed the government’s interest in restricting the speech.64 Ap-
plying this test to the case of a police officer alleging retaliation due to re-
marks he made in a union contract negotiation meeting, the Sixth Circuit 
adopted a per se rule that union activities do not fall within the employment 
duties of a public employee.65 Therefore, public employees speaking on un-
ion matters speak as citizens—rather than employees—in the Sixth Circuit.66 
The Sixth Circuit noted, however, that it has no per se rule determining 
whether a public employee’s union speech references a “matter of public con-
cern.”67 The court therefore analyzed the nature and context of the police of-
ficer’s comments and determined that they pertained to “matters of public 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Ellins, 710 F.3d at 1058, 1060; see Fuerst, 454 F.3d at 774 (noting the difference between 
speech made as part of a public employee’s union membership, and speech that falls under his 
official job duties). The Ninth Circuit noted that Fuerst held that a police officer’s statements as a 
member of his union are not considered part of his employment duties. Ellins, 710 F.3d at 1060 
(citing Fuerst, 454 F.3d at 772, 774). The Ninth Circuit provided further support for this idea by 
noting that there is an “inherent institutional conflict of interest” between employers and their 
unions. Id. This natural conflict of interest means that a police officer’s comments in his capacity 
as a union representative are private speech and cannot be part of his official duties. Id. 
 63 See Boulton, 795 F.3d at 528 (affirming a grant of summary judgment against an officer 
who claimed his First Amendment rights were violated when he was demoted—and ultimately 
suspended—after disagreeing with a superior officer during a contract arbitration meeting). In 
Boulton, a police sergeant in Genessee County, Michigan sought relief for being disciplined after 
he made remarks contradicting a superior officer at a union contract negotiation. Id. at 528–29. 
After his supervisor spoke about various trainings for police officers, Sergeant Boulton stated that 
the supervisor had not given an accurate account of the levels of training given to Sherriff’s Offic-
ers. Id. at 529. After this meeting, Boulton was demoted and then suspended without pay. Id. 
Boulton subsequently filed a suit in Michigan state court before adding a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, 
alleging the actions taken against him were done in violation of his First Amendment rights. Id. at 
530. 
 64 Id. at 531 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)). 
 65 Id. at 534. The Sixth Circuit called it “axiomatic” that taking on the role of a union member 
of leader cannot be part of public employee’s official job duties. Id. Thus, public employees 
speaking on union matters must be speaking “as . . . citizen[s]” in the context of First Amendment 
analysis. Id. 
 66 See id. (stating that a public employee’s official job duties cannot include any duty of act-
ing as a member of a labor union). 
 67 Id. To decide whether union speech touches upon “matters of public concern,” the court 
must evaluate the context of the speech and determine “the point of the speech in question.” Id. 
(quoting Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1187 (6th Cir. 1995)). 
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concern.”68 As a result, the court found that the officer spoke as a citizen, ra-
ther than an employee, on a “matter of public concern” when he contradicted 
his supervisor at the union contract arbitration meeting, and his statements 
were protected by the First Amendment.69 
B. Montero II’s Split with the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
Collectively, the rulings from the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
demonstrate per se rules that protect union speech based on the idea that such 
speech cannot be deemed a part of a public employee’s official duties.70 The 
Second Circuit, however, has taken a different approach to union speech in 
the context of First Amendment protection.71 Montero II built upon the Sec-
ond Circuit’s 2010 ruling in Weintraub v. Board of Education of City School 
District, which held that a public school teacher’s union grievance was not 
protected by the First Amendment.72 
Although the facts in Montero II are similar to the scenarios at issue in 
Swetlik, Fuerst, Ellins, and Boulton—a police officer bringing a claim for 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Id. at 535. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that Boulton’s statements were against the interests 
of his union, as well as his personal interests, because they suggested that the Sherriff’s Office was 
not providing proper training in certain areas, and the remedy for this problem would be adding an 
additional staff position which would siphon funds away from union members. Id. Moreover, 
since Boulton’s comments dealt with training relating to the use of force—which is a requirement 
under Michigan state law—they dealt with “matters of public concern.” Id. 
 69 Id. The Sixth Circuit noted that the defendants presented no significant interest in restrict-
ing Boulton’s speech. Id. Even though Boulton’s statements were protected under the First 
Amendment, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the 
county because Boulton failed to show that the actions taken against him were directly related to 
his speech. Id. at 528. Boulton had various allegations of misconduct surrounding him at the time 
of the contract negotiation meeting. Id. at 529. He failed to show that the actions against him were 
a direct result of his union speech as opposed to allegations of misconduct against him unrelated to 
his union speech. Id. at 528. 
 70 See id. at 534 (holding that a union member who speaks on union matters speaks “as a 
citizen” for purposes of First Amendment protection); Swetlik, 738 F.3d at 826 (holding that be-
cause a police officer’s statements at a union meeting and in a union grievance were made in the 
context of his union membership, they were not made pursuant to his employment duties and were 
therefore protected); Ellins, 710 F.3d at 1060 (stating that natural conflicts exist between employ-
ers and unions of employees, and therefore holding that when police officers speak pursuant to 
their union membership, they do not speak as public employees); Fuerst, 454 F.3d at 774 (stating 
that a police officer’s statements make in the context of his union membership were not part of his 
job duties as a police officer). 
 71 See Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of N.Y.C., 593 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 
2010) (holding that speech can be “pursuant to” an employee’s official duties even when it is not a 
necessary part of the job). Weintraub involved a public school teacher who filed a union grievance 
after a student who repeatedly threw books at him was not disciplined. Id. at 199. 
 72 Id. at 198. The Second Circuit held that the teacher’s grievance was not private citizen 
speech because it was a necessary part of remedying his concerns about his ability to do his job, 
and because the average citizen could not file the kind of union grievance filed by the teacher. Id. 
at 203. 
2019] Police Officers’ Union Speech and First Amendment Retaliation Claims II.-287 
alleged retaliation against speech made in his capacity as a union official—
the Second Circuit elected not to establish a per se rule to protect all union 
speech of this nature.73 While the Second Circuit ruled that Montero himself 
spoke “as a private citizen,” it specifically refused to establish a rule that all 
employee speech in the union context is “private citizen” speech.74 The Sec-
ond Circuit has therefore split from the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits on 
the issue of whether a public employee’s speech as a member of a union can 
possibly be part of his or her official duties.75 
III. UNION SPEECH AS DISTINCT FROM EMPLOYEE SPEECH 
On June 27, 2018—just one month after the Second Circuit’s ruling in 
Montero v. City of Yonkers—the Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, a 
pivotal case ruling that public employees cannot be compelled to pay union 
agency fees if they do not wish to be part of an employee union.76 Janus 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See Montero II, 890 F.3d at 390, 399 (holding a police officer who claimed retaliation 
“spoke as a private citizen” when he made comments at union meeting, but refusing to establish a 
per se rule that any union member who speaks in that capacity “speaks as a private citizen”); 
Boulton, 795 F.3d at 534 (holding that a union member who speaks on union matters speaks “as a 
citizen” for purposes of First Amendment protection); Swetlik, 738 F.3d at 826 (holding that be-
cause a police officer’s statements at a union meeting and in a union grievance were made in the 
context of his union membership, they were not made pursuant to his employment duties and were 
therefore protected); Ellins, 710 F.3d at 1060 (stating that natural conflicts exist between employ-
ers and unions of employees, and therefore ruling that when police officers speak pursuant to their 
union membership, they do not speak as public employees); Fuerst, 454 F.3d at 774 (stating that a 
police officer’s statements make in the context of his union membership were not part of his job 
duties as a police officer). 
 74 Montero II, 890 F.3d at 399. The Second Circuit relied on reasoning from Weintraub to 
reach this conclusion, holding that Montero’s statements were not “undertaken in the course of 
performing” or used as a “means to fulfill” his official duties. Id. (quoting Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 
203). 
 75 See id. at 390, 399 (holding a police officer who claimed retaliation “spoke as a private 
citizen” when he made comments at union meeting, but refusing to establish a per se rule that any 
union member who speaks in that capacity “speaks as a private citizen”); Boulton, 795 F.3d at 534 
(holding that a union member who speaks on union matters speaks “as a citizen” for purposes of 
First Amendment protection); Swetlik, 738 F.3d at 826 (holding that because a police officer’s 
statements at a union meeting and in a union grievance were made in the context of his union 
membership, they were not made pursuant to his employment duties and were therefore protect-
ed); Ellins, 710 F.3d at 1060 (stating that natural conflicts exist between employers and unions of 
employees, and therefore ruling that when police officers speak pursuant to their union member-
ship, they do not speak as public employees); Fuerst, 454 F.3d at 774 (stating that a police of-
ficer’s statements make in the context of his union membership were not part of his job duties as a 
police officer). 
 76 See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Mun., & Cty. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018) (hold-
ing that systems which force public employees to pay for union activities even when they choose 
not to be union members violates the First Amendment). Janus arose from a suit brought by a 
child support specialist for the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services regarding 
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overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, which held that the “agency 
shop” system of union representation—in which all public employees repre-
sented by a union could be compelled to pay union fees equal to member 
dues regardless of whether they are union members—was constitutional.77 In 
overruling Abood, the Court stated that the 1977 decision had allowed the 
First Amendment to be violated by agency-fee systems for forty-one years.78  
Although the question of union dues addressed by Janus is distinct from 
the question of whether union speech is the speech of private citizens, the 
Court’s ruling in Janus suggests that because public employees can no longer 
be forced to subsidize union activities, union speech cannot be characterized 
as speech that is required as part of a public employee’s job duties.79 In light 
of this ruling, if given the chance to re-address the issue, the Second Circuit 
should follow the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits and establish a rule that 
                                                                                                                           
union agency fees he was required to pay under state law regardless of his wish not to be a mem-
ber of the union. Id. at 2461–62. 
 77 See id. at 2459–60, 2478 (stating that Abood upheld a law that required public employees to 
pay dues to unions regardless of whether they were members, and that such a law is inconsistent 
with the First Amendment); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 211, 236 (1977) (describ-
ing the “agency shop” system at issue), overruled by Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448. Abood held that pub-
lic employment may be conditioned on paying fees that fund collective-bargaining undertakings, 
but that employees who are not union members cannot be forced to pay for “ideological activities” 
that are not necessary to the collective bargaining process. 431 U.S. at 236; see Janus, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2460–61 (describing the union activities that nonmember public employees could be charged 
for under Abood). Abood noted the potential difficulties that could arise in attempting to distin-
guish between activities necessary for collective bargaining, and actions which promote a union’s 
ideological beliefs. 431 U.S. at 236. In Janus, the Court stated that modern unions often charge 
nonmembers for activities related to collective bargaining, as opposed only charging for pure 
collective bargaining costs. 138 S. Ct. at 2461. 
 78 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460. 
 79 See id. at 2448, 2459–60, 2474 (stating that the system of forcing public employees to pay 
for union activities even when they are not union members violates the First Amendment, and that 
in their capacity as negotiating bodies, unions speak on behalf of the employees they represent, 
rather than their employers). Janus held that public employees cannot be forced to “subsidize” a 
union by being compelled to pay agency fees as nonmembers. Id. at 2460. Prior to this ruling, 
twenty-eight states had enacted laws prohibiting the sort of union dues that Janus objected to. 
Union Agency Fees Violate First Amendment, 36 MCQUILLIN MUN. L. REP. (Research Grp., Char-
lottesville, Va.), Aug. 2018, at 1; see Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2466 (noting that twenty-eight states had 
already outlawed agency fees, and the number of public employees represented by unions in those 
states totaled in the millions). Additionally, federal law prior to Janus prohibited agency fees, 
meaning that almost one million federal workers were represented by unions but did not pay agen-
cy fees. 138 S. Ct. at 2466. By ruling that agency fees violate the First Amendment and are there-
fore unconstitutional, the Supreme Court held that public sector employees must be allowed to 
hold their jobs without subsidizing the unions that represent them. See id. at 2460, 2486 (conclud-
ing that systems which force public employees to pay union dues even when they disagree with 
union actions violates employees’ First Amendment rights). The Court also stated that the claim 
that a public employee’s official job duties encompass his or her speech as a union official “dis-
torts” the realities of the collective bargaining process. Id. at 2474. 
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union speech is per se the speech of “private citizens” rather than public em-
ployees acting to fulfil their official duties.80 
By ruling that public employees cannot be forced to pay union agency 
fees because such fees violate their First Amendment rights, the Supreme 
Court has made a clear distinction between the duties and interests inherent in 
union membership, and a public employee’s official duties.81 This distinction 
aligns with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre that 
government employers have an “inherent institutional conflict of interest” 
with the unions that represent public sector employees in collective bargain-
ing agreements.82 Though Janus did not specifically address the issue of 
whether a public employee’s speech as a union member can constitute speech 
pursuant to the employee’s official duties, dicta in the case suggests that un-
ion speech cannot be characterized as speech in furtherance of a public em-
ployee’s job requirements.83 The facts of Montero II serve as evidence of this 
assertion, since Montero’s criticism of other union members reflected his own 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474 (stating that union speech is not equivalent to employer 
speech); Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that a union member 
who speaks on union matters speaks “as a citizen” for purposes of First Amendment protection); 
Swetlik v. Crawford, 738 F.3d 818, 826 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that because a police officer’s 
statements at a union meeting and in a union grievance were made in the context of his union 
membership, they were not made pursuant to his employment duties and were therefore protect-
ed); Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that natural con-
flicts exist between employers and unions of employees, and therefore ruling that when police 
officers speak pursuant to their union membership, they do not speak as public employees); Fuerst 
v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that a police officer’s statements make in the 
context of his union membership were not part of his job duties as a police officer). 
 81 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474 (stating that union speech is not equivalent to employer 
speech); Ellins, 710 F.3d at 1060 (describing the “inherent institutional conflict of interest” that 
exists between employers and unions of employees). Central to the Court’s reasoning is the idea 
that when an employee’s speech is part of his or her job duties, the speech is not really that of the 
employee, but rather is the employer’s speech. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474. Therefore, “if the un-
ion’s speech is really the employer’s speech, then the employer could dictate what the union 
says,” which, of course, is not the case. See id. (stating that the Court presumes unions would 
dislike the claim that their employers could determine what union members can and cannot say). 
 82 Ellins, 710 F.3d at 1060. Based on this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit established its rule that 
public employees do not act pursuant to their employment duties when they speak as union mem-
bers on union matters. Id. 
 83 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474 (stating that when union representatives deal with their em-
ployers, they speak for the employees they represent, rather than the employers). Specifically, the 
Court stated that the structure of collective bargaining arrangements inherently means that em-
ployees speaking in their capacities as union members do not speak in their capacity as public 
employees because the interests of the union do not align with the interests of the employer. Id. 
This stems from the fact that when unions represent employees, their purpose is to negotiate with 
the employer on behalf of employees. See id. (“But when a union negotiates with the employer or 
represents employees in disciplinary proceedings, the union speaks for the employees, not the 
employer. Otherwise, the employer would be negotiating with itself and disputing its own ac-
tions.”). 
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personal views about the relationships and decisions made within the union, 
and could not, therefore, be deemed speech on behalf of his employer.84  
The Second Circuit was therefore incorrect in splitting from the Sixth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits and declining to establish a per se rule that mem-
bers of unions speak in their personal capacities rather than their capacities as 
employees.85 The Second Circuit’s decision suggests that there could be situa-
tions in which a union member speaking on union issues could speak pursu-
ant to his or her official job duties.86 This suggestion, however, contradicts 
the Supreme Court’s assertion in Janus that if union speech is speech required 
by a public employee’s job, then government employers can control what 
union members are allowed to say about union matters.87 The Second Circuit 
should resolve the split and follow the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Janus 
by establishing a categorical rule that when a public employee speaks as a 
union member, he or she speaks as an individual and not pursuant to his or 
her job duties.88 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474 (stating that when unions negotiate with their employers, they 
represent the employees rather than the employer itself); Montero v. City of Yonkers (Montero II), 
890 F.3d. 386, 391–93 (2d Cir. 2018) (describing Montero’s criticism of other union members, 
and the subsequent actions taken against him by his supervisors). The Second Circuit made it clear 
that Montero’s speech could not be deemed speech pursuant to his job responsibilities because it 
did not help fulfill any of his job duties. Montero II, 890 F.3d at 399. 
 85 See Montero II, 890 F.3d at 390, 399 (holding a police officer who claimed retaliation 
“spoke as a private citizen” when he made comments at union meeting, but refusing to establish a 
per se rule that any union member who speaks in that capacity “speaks as a private citizen”); 
Boulton, 795 F.3d at 534 (holding that a union member who speaks on union matters speaks “as a 
citizen” for purposes of First Amendment protection); Swetlik, 738 F.3d at 826 (holding that be-
cause a police officer’s statements at a union meeting and in a union grievance were made in the 
context of his union membership, they were not made pursuant to his employment duties and were 
therefore protected); Ellins, 710 F.3d at 1060 (stating that natural conflicts exist between employ-
ers and unions of employees, and therefore ruling that when police officers speak pursuant to their 
union membership, they do not speak as public employees); Fuerst, 454 F.3d at 774 (stating that a 
police officer’s statements make in the context of his union membership were not part of his job 
duties as a police officer). 
 86 See Montero II, 890 F.3d at 399 (stating that it will not establish a per se rule that people 
speaking as members of labor unions always speak in their private capacities, rather than as part of 
their job duties). The Second Circuit did conclude, however, that Montero spoke in his private 
capacity because his statements did not help to fulfill his job duties. Id. 
 87 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474; see Montero II, 890 F.3d at 399 (choosing not to establish a per 
se rule that people speaking in their capacities as union members are speaking as private citizens 
rather than as part of their job requirements). 
 88 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474 (stating that the argument that union speech is contained 
within the official duties of public employees “distorts collective bargaining and grievance ad-
justment beyond recognition”); Montero II, 890 F.3d at 390, 399 (holding a police officer who 
claimed retaliation “spoke as a private citizen” when he made comments at union meeting, but 
refusing to establish a per se rule that any union member who speaks in that capacity “speaks as a 
private citizen”); Boulton, 795 F.3d at 534 (holding that a union member who speaks on union 
matters speaks “as a citizen” for purposes of First Amendment protection); Swetlik, 738 F.3d at 
826 (holding that because a police officer’s statements at a union meeting and in a union grievance 
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CONCLUSION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit incorrectly 
declined to establish a categorical rule that public employees who speak in 
their capacities as union members speak as private citizens and not as part of 
their employment duties. In its Montero II ruling, the Second Circuit split 
from the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, which had all established cate-
gorical rules that public employees do not act pursuant to their official duties 
when speaking as union representatives, but instead speak as private citizens. 
The categorical rules established by the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
align with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Janus by making a clear distinc-
tion between union speech and speech that is required by a public employee’s 
official job duties. By failing to adopt a categorical rule in this area, and 
thereby suggesting that some union speech could be part of a public employ-
ee’s official duties, the Second Circuit has diverged from the Supreme Court’s 
dicta in Janus stating that union speech cannot be part of a public employee’s 
job responsibilities. 
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were made in the context of his union membership, they were not made pursuant to his employ-
ment duties and were therefore protected); Ellins, 710 F.3d at 1060 (stating that natural conflicts 
exist between employers and unions of employees, and therefore ruling that when police officers 
speak pursuant to their union membership, they do not speak as public employees); Fuerst, 454 
F.3d at 774 (stating that a police officer’s statements make in the context of his union membership 
were not part of his job duties as a police officer). 
